A damning internal investigation by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has concluded that the October 7 Hamas attack was “one of the greatest failures” in the history of Israel’s military and security apparatus. The inquiry, compiled over thousands of hours of research, reveals critical lapses in intelligence and preparedness that allowed the devastating assault to unfold.

On October 7, 2023, an estimated 5,600 Hamas militants stormed southern Israel in a highly coordinated assault, killing 1,320 people and taking 251 hostages. The attack, which came in three waves, saw gunmen infiltrating Israeli communities, overwhelming military positions, and targeting civilians at a music festival.

Intelligence Failures and Tactical Missteps

The IDF’s internal review acknowledges a “complete failure” in its mission to protect Israeli citizens. The findings indicate that intelligence agencies underestimated Hamas’s capability and intent to wage a full-scale war, despite mounting signs of unusual activity in Gaza before the attack.

Key intelligence failures include:

  • Misplaced Priorities: The IDF’s primary focus had been on threats from Iran and Hezbollah, relegating Gaza to a secondary concern. Military forces had been shifted toward Israel’s northern border, leaving only minimal defenses near Gaza.
  • Overconfidence in Defensive Measures: Israeli officials had relied on an expensive subterranean border wall and electronic surveillance, believing it would prevent a mass infiltration.
  • Ignored Warning Signs: The report states that Israeli intelligence dismissed Hamas’s pre-attack movements as mere training exercises. Unusual activity—such as the activation of Israeli SIM cards inside Gaza—was detected but not deemed an immediate threat.

The IDF also admits that during the initial response, soldiers resorted to using Google Maps and mobile phones to communicate as command structures collapsed under the scale of the attack.

Brutality and Aftermath

The report highlights the extreme brutality of the Hamas assault, noting that IDF forces were unprepared for the level of violence. Hamas militants moved rapidly, targeting civilians and military personnel alike. Israeli Air Force officials also admitted that difficulties in distinguishing between hostiles and civilians led to deaths from friendly fire.

By the evening of October 7, Hamas forces were still spread across multiple locations in southern Israel, with plans to advance as far as Ashkelon, just 12 miles from the Gaza Strip.

The report also confirms that Hamas had been preparing for such an attack for nearly a decade. Planning allegedly began in November 2016, with the final decision to launch the assault made in July 2019. Hamas reportedly came close to executing the attack three times in 2022 but ultimately held back.

Political Fallout and Calls for Accountability

The findings have intensified scrutiny on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, with critics accusing him of failing to take responsibility. Opposition voices have called for a full State Commission of Inquiry, Israel’s highest level of investigation, but Netanyahu’s administration has resisted, arguing that the ongoing war takes priority.

As Israel continues its military operations in Gaza, at least 66 hostages taken on October 7 remain in captivity. Officials estimate that about half of those still in Gaza are alive.

The Israeli response to the attack has resulted in a large-scale military campaign, with Gaza’s health authorities reporting over 48,000 Palestinian deaths since the start of the conflict.

Meanwhile, the IDF plans to present additional findings on specific attacks—such as those on individual kibbutzim and military bases—to affected communities in the coming days.

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